Xi in Washington: Is China Becoming the Only ‘Next China’?

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By TRH Op-Ed Desk

As Trump rolls out the red carpet for Xi Jinping, the US-China summit puts trade, AI, rare earths and Taiwan back at the centre of global geopolitics—with India watching closely

New Delhi, September 23, 2026 — Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington has revived a larger geopolitical question: after years of Western efforts to reduce dependence on China, is Beijing once again becoming too important for the US and its allies to bypass?

Manish Anand, a geopolitics analyst, argues in a monologue for The Raisina Hills that the idea of “China Plus One” and India as the “next China” has lost some of its earlier momentum since the pandemic.

“Today, it appears that the world has accepted that there is no alternative to China,” Anand says, arguing that the renewed engagement between Washington and Beijing reflects the continuing weight of the Chinese economy and its position in global supply chains.

Xi’s visit, his first state visit to the US in more than a decade, is being closely watched because Washington and Beijing are simultaneously competitors and deeply interconnected economic powers. US President Donald Trump is personally receiving Xi at Joint Base Andrews, followed by a high-profile state programme.

The summit is expected to cover tariffs, artificial intelligence, rare earths, Taiwan and Iran. The existing trade truce is also a major issue, with key arrangements involving Chinese rare-earth exports due to come under renewed pressure in November.

For Anand, the critical issue is China’s leverage over global manufacturing and strategic supply chains.

The United States itself recognises that vulnerability. A September hearing before the US House Ways and Means Committee noted that China controls around 90% of global rare-earth processing capacity and is the leading producer of at least 30 of the 60 minerals classified as critical by Washington.

That leverage has become especially important as competition expands into electric vehicles, defence technologies, semiconductors and artificial intelligence.

India’s Worry: Rare Earths as a Weapon of Modern Diplomacy

The AI contest is now emerging as another central component of the relationship. US and Chinese officials are discussing AI safety and crisis-management mechanisms even as Washington seeks to retain its technological advantage and Beijing seeks greater access to advanced technology.

Taiwan remains the harder strategic question. US arms sales to Taiwan remain a major Chinese concern, while Taiwan is closely watching whether Washington maintains its existing security commitments.

This is where the India dimension becomes important.

Anand argues that India’s earlier strategic importance to Washington was strengthened by the China Plus One investment strategy and the Indo-Pacific framework, including the Quad. His contention is that a more transactional US-China relationship could reduce some of the geopolitical space India had gained from strategic competition between Washington and Beijing.

The current evidence, however, points to a more complicated picture. The Quad remains an established grouping of India, the US, Japan and Australia, while the Trump-Xi engagement is being described by US strategic institutions as an attempt to stabilise an intensely competitive relationship—not an end to that competition.

The larger message from Washington is therefore not necessarily that China has replaced every alternative, but that China remains indispensable to the global economic system even for the power most deeply engaged in competing with it.

For India, the implication is significant. If Washington and Beijing can manage their disputes over trade, technology and critical minerals, New Delhi may need to build its own economic and strategic weight rather than depend on US-China rivalry to create space for India’s rise.

As Xi receives a highly choreographed welcome in Washington, the real test may therefore extend well beyond the optics of the summit: whether the world’s two largest powers can convert competition into managed coexistence—and what that means for the strategic room available to India.