Why China–Japan Ties Are Entering Their Most Dangerous Phase

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Deep trade interdependence can no longer mask historical trauma, Taiwan tensions, and a fast-hardening security rivalry in East Asia.

By TRH Foreign Affairs Desk

New Delhi, December 17, 2025 — The relationship between China and Japan is once again being shaped less by commerce and more by confrontation. As Anita Anand argues in her analysis for the USANAS Foundation, the contradiction at the heart of this relationship is stark: two economies deeply intertwined, yet two political systems locked in strategic mistrust rooted in unresolved history and sharpened by Taiwan.

That contradiction burst into the open when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi declared that a war over Taiwan could threaten Japan’s own security. Beijing reacted furiously. For China, Taiwan remains a core sovereignty issue; for Japan, invoking a “direct threat to survival” is no rhetorical flourish but a legal trigger under its post-2015 security laws, enabling military deployment and collective self-defence. Words, in this case, carry missiles.

China’s response went far beyond diplomatic protest. Travel advisories battered Japanese tourism, seafood imports were banned, and Chinese Coast Guard vessels intensified their presence around the disputed Senkaku Islands. Military drills followed. Beijing even took the fight to the United Nations, accusing Tokyo of destabilising alignments. Japan, however, did not retreat. Instead, it doubled down—politically and militarily.

At the core of the tension lies Taiwan. Japan formally recognised the People’s Republic of China in 1972 and acknowledged Beijing’s position on Taiwan. Yet today, Japan’s growing influence in Taiwan—where public sentiment toward Japan is notably positive—has become a strategic irritant for China. In Beijing’s view, Japan is reinforcing the US-led “First Island Chain,” a maritime barrier constraining China’s naval ambitions.

The United States looms large in this equation. The US–Japan alliance has deepened as China’s assertiveness has grown, from joint military exercises to coordination on technology, climate, and supply chains. Japan’s decision to raise defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2027—backed by investments in long-range strike capabilities and US-made Tomahawk missiles—marks a historic departure from post-war pacifism.

The fallout is regional. Japan is exporting security cooperation to partners like the Philippines, while China expands its strategic footprint in Southeast Asia and weaponises trade through bans on seafood and rare earths. Anand notes that this mutual hardening makes de-escalation increasingly unlikely.

Once anchored by landmark agreements and cautious diplomacy, China–Japan relations are now at their lowest ebb. History’s unhealed wounds, combined with Taiwan and maritime disputes, have transformed rivalry into risk—posing serious consequences not just for the two powers, but for the stability of the entire Indo-Pacific.