Simultaneous Poll Bill Fails Tests of Reasons: PRS Analysis
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Simultaneous Elections Bill Raises Key Concerns Around Governance, Voter Engagement, and Constitutional Safeguards
By AMIT KUMAR
NEW DELHI, June 10, 2025 – A detailed analysis of the Constitution Amendment Bill on simultaneous elections by PRS Legislative Research has flagged critical legal and governance concerns, even as the Bill aims to streamline the country’s electoral process by holding Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections together.
The proposal, which draws support from past parliamentary committee recommendations and the recent High-Level Committee on One Nation, One Election, seeks to address rising election-related costs and frequent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC). However, the PRS analysis raises substantial questions about the proposed framework’s implications on accountability, legislative stability, and democratic functioning.
A Legacy Debate Revisited
Citing Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s remarks from the Constituent Assembly debates of 1948, PRS notes that the Indian parliamentary system was consciously designed to prioritize accountability over stability. In contrast to fixed-term executive systems like the presidential model, the Indian model allows for continuous legislative oversight. Dr. Ambedkar had warned against overemphasizing stability at the cost of daily and periodic accountability—something simultaneous elections could dilute.
Costs vs. Constitutional Integrity
According to the Bill’s Statement of Objects and Reasons, the current electoral model is seen as expensive and disruptive. But PRS points out that official estimates tell a different story.
In 2015-16, election-related central government expenditure stood at ₹4,500 crore—merely 0.03% of GDP. While unofficial estimates peg overall costs (including party and candidate spending) much higher—up to ₹1.35 lakh crore in 2024—PRS questions whether this justifies overhauling the electoral architecture.
Election Fatigue or Electoral Vigilance?
While acknowledging the logistical stretch of prolonged multi-phase elections—43 days in 2024 compared to 3-4 days in the 1980s—PRS suggests this trend may be managed by optimizing scheduling, rather than restructuring terms of government.
Importantly, advancements in technology, administration, and infrastructure since earlier decades should, in fact, support more efficient elections without constitutional amendments.
Impact of MCC: A Governance ‘Myth’?
The Bill contends that frequent MCC imposition halts governance. But PRS cites the Election Commission of India (ECI), which has clarified that MCC does not prevent ongoing schemes, emergency relief, or fund disbursements.
It mainly curtails new announcements that could influence voters. The Law Commission (2018) also found MCC leads to cautious governance—not complete paralysis.
Curtailment of Legislative Terms: A Democratic Risk?
One of the most striking issues flagged is the possibility of extremely short legislative terms—sometimes under a year. Under the Bill, if elections are synchronized for 2034, states with assemblies elected in 2033 may serve barely a few months.
Similarly, in case of early Lok Sabha dissolution, the next term could last just months before the full-cycle election.
PRS warns that such curtailed tenures could severely impact governance quality. Ministers may lack time to understand administrative machinery, while short-term governments may be pushed toward populist decisions over long-term policy planning—contradicting the foundational logic of India’s five-year term system, which was extended from four years after constitutional consultations in 1947.
Postponement Powers and Governance Vacuum
Another red flag is the Bill’s provision allowing the ECI to recommend deferment of state elections without defining strict conditions. Unlike Article 356, which requires emergency proclamation, President’s Rule, and parliamentary ratification, the Bill offers no such safeguards.
PRS warns that this could lead to scenarios where state assemblies are dissolved and elections postponed indefinitely, with no clarity on who governs in the interim. The current system ensures continuity by mandating elections upon expiry of a term—a mechanism the Bill could potentially weaken.
Global Comparisons and Limited Precedence
Sweden and Belgium offer the closest parallels. While both allow for term adjustments in case of early elections, they have either never invoked the provision (Sweden) or relied on caretaker governments to avoid successive polls (Belgium). The Indian context, with its scale and diversity, lacks similar historical examples.
PRS also notes that voter behaviour in such scenarios is unpredictable. Interim elections with known short tenures may witness low turnout or reduced engagement, undermining electoral legitimacy.
While the Bill on simultaneous elections seeks to tackle issues of cost, continuity, and campaign overload, the PRS Legislative Research analysis concludes that its implementation could come at the expense of legislative accountability, constitutional safeguards, and voter trust. It raises a fundamental question: does the marginal gain in administrative efficiency justify the constitutional trade-offs?
The debate now hinges on whether India’s democracy should prioritize seamless scheduling or preserve the delicate balance between stability and accountability envisioned by its framers.
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