Pakistan-Saudi Pact Raises Prospect of Covert US Arms Sales

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As Riyadh bankrolls Islamabad’s military ambitions, speculation grows over US weapons sales under Trump. But with 81% of Pakistan’s arsenal sourced from China, New Delhi watches warily for even symbolic American upgrades.

By TRH Global Affairs Desk

NEW DELHI, September 19, 2025 — Islamabad’s defence pact with Riyadh, signed just two days ago, is already reshaping South Asian strategic debates. The agreement — covering military training, joint drills, and defence-industrial partnerships — has sparked speculation that Saudi Arabia could soon bankroll US weapons sales to Pakistan, reviving an arrangement last seen in the 1970s.

For India, the prospect triggers old anxieties. Any hint of advanced American hardware entering Pakistan’s arsenal — however symbolic — revives memories of the F-16 saga, when US fighter jets were supplied under restrictions but later used in combat against India. New Delhi has long warned that external military aid to Pakistan only emboldens its security establishment and destabilizes the region.

Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to Washington, drew the historical parallel bluntly: “Most likely, Pakistan will now be able to buy US weapons it needs, with Saudi money, which the Trump administration seems willing to sell. Similar purchases occurred in the 1970s when US Congress was unwilling to approve loans under Foreign Military Funding (FMF).”

But critics note that today’s landscape is different. Investigative journalist Murtaza Hussain cautioned that US systems come with “onerous political restrictions” and suspected backdoors. He pointed out that earlier F-16 sales to Pakistan carried explicit curbs on use against India — a reminder that even American firepower is tightly leashed. “Beyond a few symbolic purchases,” he argued, “huge systems would only lock Pakistan into dependencies, with no guarantee of future superiority.”

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defence partnership with Beijing dwarfs all others. Nearly 81% of Islamabad’s arsenal now comes from China, spanning fighter jets, missile systems, and naval platforms. Unlike Washington, Beijing offers equipment without political strings, often backed by joint manufacturing. With Gulf capital, Islamabad could easily double down on Chinese weapons or invest in regional co-production ventures with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Saudi Arabia itself.

Yet some observers argue the 1970s analogy still carries weight. With US laws like ITAR and doctrines such as “Qualitative Military Edge” barring frontline systems like the F-35, Washington might still consider selling mid-tier equipment — or updating Pakistan’s aging F-16 fleet. If Trump’s pro-Saudi stance persists, such deals could resurface as compromise options.

For Washington, the calculus is simple: Saudi funding could reopen doors to Pakistan, allowing America to claw back some leverage in South Asia even as China cements itself as Islamabad’s primary supplier. For Riyadh, underwriting such purchases reinforces its leadership role in the Muslim world while tightening bonds with both Islamabad and Trump’s Washington.

But for India, the risks are clear. Even a symbolic US arms transfer to Pakistan could shift regional perceptions, embolden Rawalpindi, and complicate New Delhi’s defence planning. Having watched US-Pakistan defence ties swing between warmth and sanctions for decades, India knows that even limited upgrades can carry disproportionate psychological and strategic weight.

As one analyst on X put it: “The 1970s analogy holds some weight, but today’s geopolitics differ. With 81% of Pakistan’s weapons sourced from China, F-35s are off the table. F-16s or mid-tier weapons could fit as a compromise.” For India, however, even that compromise is one concern too many.

The Saudi-Pakistan defence pact may open new avenues for Islamabad, but for New Delhi it revives a familiar challenge: managing the fallout of great-power games in its neighbourhood.