Opinion: SC TN Bill Verdict Distorts Constitutional Federalism

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Supreme Court of India, India parliament, Tamil Nadu CM and Governor MK Stalin and RN Ravi !

Supreme Court of India, India parliament, Tamil Nadu CM and Governor MK Stalin and RN Ravi (Image credit X.com)

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Storm over Article 200: The SC Verdict on Governors’ Powers and Constitutional Fallout

By Sesh Kumar Pulipaka

On 9 April 2025, a Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered a controversial verdict that, while attempting to enforce timely gubernatorial assent to bills, opened a Pandora’s box of constitutional questions. By prescribing a strict timeline for Governors to act on bills passed by State Legislatures and declaring Presidential assent null in certain cases, the judgment has sparked intense debate over the separation of powers, federal structure, and judicial overreach. This narrative evaluates the implications of the judgment, its legal anomalies, and the danger it poses to the constitutional equilibrium among the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.

The Verdict and Its Immediate Fallout

The Supreme Court’s ruling, framed ostensibly to uphold constitutional governance in the face of alleged obstruction by Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi, has instead stirred a hornet’s nest. The judgment imposes a de facto timeline of one to three months for Governors to act on State Legislature bills. More explosively, the Court declared that if a Governor forwards a bill to the President after its reconsideration by the State Assembly, such an act is constitutionally impermissible—and that even a Presidential decision on such a bill would be treated as void. The Bench invoked Article 142, the Court’s extraordinary power to do “complete justice,” to enforce this unprecedented position.

Critics argue that the judgment amounts to a judicial coup, an audacious breach of constitutional boundaries that undermines the federal structure and negates the discretionary role envisaged for constitutional heads like Governors and the President.

The Constitutional Position: Article 200 and Presidential Discretion

Under Article 200 of the Constitution, the Governor has several options when a bill is presented to them: grant assent, withhold assent, return the bill (if it’s not a money bill), or reserve it for the President’s consideration. Crucially, no timeline is prescribed for the Governor to exercise these options. While this has admittedly led to misuse—such as the Tamil Nadu episode where bills were delayed or reserved indefinitely—any attempt to impose a rigid timeline without constitutional amendment amounts to judicial legislation, something the judiciary has historically condemned when done by others.

Moreover, Article 201 lays down that when a bill is reserved for the President’s consideration, the President may either assent or withhold assent—again, without any time limit and without scope for judicial interference in this sovereign discretion.

The April 2025 judgment, however, does more than simply impose a deadline. It asserts that if the President has taken a decision on a reconsidered State bill (forwarded again by the Governor), such a decision will be null and void. This is a direct intrusion into the authority of the President, a constitutional head elected through a broad-based electoral college and empowered to act on Cabinet advice in such matters.

Such an assertion may amount to rewriting the Constitution by judicial fiat—a move that could invite concern not only for its implications but also for the manner of its delivery, through a two-judge Bench rather than a Constitution Bench of five or more judges, as mandated under Article 145(3) when substantial interpretation of the Constitution is involved.

A Dangerous Precedent: Judicial Overreach or Necessary Intervention?

Supporters of the judgment may argue that this was a necessary corrective to prevent political obstruction by nominated Governors, particularly in Opposition-ruled States. However, ends do not justify means in constitutional governance. What the judgment has achieved, in effect, is a distortion of the careful checks and balances that define India’s federal structure.

Let us address a powerful rhetorical point: If a State Legislature were to pass a bill that is patently against national interest, is the Governor still bound to grant assent within the stipulated time? The Supreme Court provides no satisfactory answer. The judgment, while aimed at ending executive delays, creates a rigid template where no room is left for reasoned discretion, national interest, or political balancing.

The irony is palpable. The Court now asserts that elected legislators represent the will of the people and must be respected by unelected Governors. But this very Court, in 2015, struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act despite it being passed unanimously in Parliament, ratified by over 16 State Legislatures, and assented to by the President. In that case, the Judiciary rejected the will of the people, and the Constitution was interpreted to safeguard judicial primacy- a crucial part of the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution.

Why then, critics ask, does the same logic not apply to the office of the Governor or the President?

Article 142: A Tool for Justice or a Trojan Horse?

Frequency and Nature of Invocation: A comprehensive study by the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad reveals that between 1950 and 2023, the Supreme Court referenced Article 142 or the phrase “complete justice” in 1,579 cases, predominantly in civil matters. However, the Court explicitly exercised its powers under Article 142 in 791 instances.

The reduction from 1,579 to 791 cases is due to the differentiation between mentioning Article 142 and actively invoking its powers. While the term or concept was cited in 1,579 cases, a closer analysis revealed that the Court exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 in 791 cases. This nuanced approach ensures clarity in understanding how often and in what contexts the Supreme Court has utilized this constitutional provision.

The invocation of Article 142 to create time-bound constraints on gubernatorial actions—and worse, to nullify Presidential decisions—sets a dangerous precedent. This article, intended to fill gaps in justice on a case-by-case basis, is now being used to impose substantive constitutional amendments, bypassing the Parliamentary process altogether.

SC Tamil Nadu Verdict: Can Judiciary Usurp Legislative Powers?

If this becomes the norm, what is to prevent the Court from fixing deadlines for Parliament to pass laws, or for the President to issue ordinances, or for Chief Ministers to respond to legislative queries? This opens the door to a form of judicial authoritarianism—where two or three judges, however well-meaning, can usurp the deliberative functions of constitutional authorities.

What Should Have Been Done Instead

The issue of delays in gubernatorial assent is real and must be addressed. But the solution lies in constitutional amendment, after wide debate in Parliament, not in ad-hoc judicial pronouncements. The Court could have directed the Union Government to frame a model code or guidelines for time-bound action by Governors and left the matter to the political executive for resolution.

Alternatively, the Chief Justice of India could have referred the matter to a Constitution Bench, given its enormous ramifications. That it was not done betrays either haste or hubris—both of which undermine institutional credibility.

A Fracture in Constitutional Balance

The Supreme Court’s verdict of April 2025, while purporting to enhance democratic accountability, ends up distorting constitutional federalism, weakening the discretionary powers of constitutional heads, and elevating the judiciary to an omnipotent status.

The Supreme Court must apply to itself the same urgency it now demands of others. Let it resolve cases in a year, let it welcome scrutiny, and let it not forget that judicial power is not unbridled—it is bound by the very Constitution it seeks to protect.

This judgment must be reconsidered—preferably by a five-judge Constitution Bench, which the Government would definitely be pursuing. Until then, the foundational question remains: Who guards the Constitution when the guardian oversteps?

(This is an opinion piece, views expressed solely belong to the author)

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