Myanmar Matrix in Mizoram: Security, Smuggling and Strategy
Pu David, a Myanmar national, in Mizoram. (Image Nirendra Dev)
Why India’s Myanmar policy is reshaping border security and smuggling dynamics in Mizoram
By NIRENDRA DEV
Champhai (Mizoram), January 29, 2026 — Pu David was riding a motorcycle, his ageing father seated behind him. At the Zote checkpost in Mizoram, Assam Rifles personnel stopped them for a routine frisk. A large bag was examined carefully before the father–son duo—visitors from a small hamlet in Myanmar, travelling to attend a Gospel convention—were allowed to proceed.
The soldier on duty wore camouflage and spoke Hindi haltingly. He was from Karnataka but had picked up conversational Mizo quickly. Focused and professional, he avoided eye contact with the unexpected presence of this author and respectfully addressed the elderly man as “Kappu”, a familiar honorific for seniors.
Colleagues describe the young jawan as instinctive and alert, able to distinguish genuine travellers from potential wrongdoers in seconds. In Mizoram, the Assam Rifles—not the BSF—guard India’s porous frontier with Myanmar and Bangladesh. Locally, they are still referred to as “The Sentinels of the North East”, a title earned through decades of counter-insurgency and border management.
Yet today, the challenge has evolved. The Kuki–Meitei conflict that erupted in Manipur in 2023 exposed how deeply narcotics, arms trafficking and insurgent networks are intertwined. What initially appeared as ethnic strife revealed criminal economies operating beneath the surface.
Myanmar lies at the heart of the Golden Triangle, alongside Laos and Thailand—one of the world’s most notorious narcotics corridors. For decades, Manipur has borne the brunt of drug abuse and smuggling, a spillover that increasingly affects Mizoram as well.
New Delhi’s approach towards Myanmar is now overtly pragmatic. The moral language of democracy promotion has receded, replaced by strategic realism. India is prepared to engage whichever authority controls Naypyidaw, just as it has recalibrated ties with Bangladesh when security and connectivity demand it.
Security analysts in Aizawl point out that India relies heavily on Myanmar’s cooperation to deny Indian insurgent groups access to forest sanctuaries across the border. At the same time, Myanmar’s military junta—while seen as China-leaning—depends on Indian support to contain armed groups like the Arakan Army and for civilian assistance, including Covid-era humanitarian supplies.
Since the 2021 coup, thousands of Myanmar nationals have taken shelter in Mizoram. Officially, New Delhi has avoided calling them “refugees,” but humanitarian aid continues quietly, largely shouldered by the Mizoram government.
Smuggling remains a parallel concern. On January 28, Badarpur Railway Police in Assam detained an Aizawl resident after recovering 10 gold biscuits weighing 1.65 kg—worth around ₹1.30 crore—on the Silchar–Guwahati Express. Investigators believe the consignment originated in Mizoram and was headed further inland, highlighting how border leakages extend deep into India’s transport network.
India and Myanmar share a 1,643-km land border governed until recently by the Free Movement Regime (FMR), activated in 2018 to allow border villagers limited cross-border travel. While meant to respect ethnic and familial ties, security agencies long warned it could be misused for smuggling and illegal movement. In 2024, New Delhi announced plans to fence the border—signalling a decisive shift.
With maritime proximity to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and strategic projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Corridor at stake, Myanmar sits at the crossroads of India’s eastern security calculus.
In Mizoram, this Myanmar matrix plays out daily—at checkposts, on trains, and along forest tracks—where faith, fear, commerce and geopolitics intersect.
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