Modi’s Tianjin Gamble: India-China Ties Amid Geopolitical Shifts

India stands at a crossroads in the Indo-Pacific—either assert as an autonomous power or risk marginalization in China’s sphere of influence.

By SAHARANSHU DASH

KATHMANDU, September 1, 2025 — Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Tianjin to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. This was intended as a snub to Washington on the back of 50% tariffs being imposed on Indian goods by the Trump administration.

However, at a time when India faces its most formidable strategic challenge from China, Modi’s presence in Tianjin risked projecting weakness rather than confidence. Critics like Brahma Chellaney have argued that the visit was reminiscent of an earlier era of misjudged diplomacy, where conciliatory gestures toward Beijing were interpreted not as goodwill, but as vulnerability. Historically, China has exploited such moments to consolidate its advantage. This time may be no different.

Officially, the summit aimed to promote regional stability, economic cooperation, and security coordination among its members. Unofficially, it was overshadowed by Beijing’s preparations for the grand September 3 military parade—a meticulously choreographed show of force. The event doubled as a rally of the world’s strongmen: Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un, Myanmar’s junta chief, and the presidents of Iran, Cuba, Belarus, and Vietnam.

Modi, representing the world’s most populous democracy, appeared as a solitary outlier in this gathering of authoritarian power brokers. As Xi Jinping projects strength through a carefully choreographed parade of military hardware and autocratic solidarity, India’s presence in this setting does not reflect strategic parity; rather, it risks reinforcing perceptions of vulnerability.

Yet, this visit is not an isolated event. It reflects the larger trajectory of India-China relations in 2025—a relationship defined by economic interdependence, persistent border tensions, and competing visions for Asia’s future.

To fully grasp the stakes of Modi’s Tianjin gamble, we must trace the historical evolution of the Sino-Indian rivalry, examine the current landscape of economic and strategic interaction, and assess the implications of emerging policy choices, including the controversial “early harvest” proposal on the Sikkim sector.

Historical Context: From Civilizational Exchange to Strategic Mistrust

The India-China relationship is as old as Asia itself, anchored in civilisational exchange and shaped by centuries of interaction. Buddhism travelled from the Gangetic plains to China in the first centuries CE, carried by monks and scholars who laid the foundation for deep cultural and intellectual ties. Trade along the Silk Road connected the two economies long before modern borders existed. For much of history, these interactions were marked by mutual respect rather than rivalry.

The rupture came in the modern era. After the Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1951—transforming a buffer region into a military stronghold—the geopolitical equation shifted dramatically. The two nations initially attempted cooperation as newly independent states. They shared anti-imperialist ideals, joined the Non-Aligned Movement, and articulated the Panchsheel principles of peaceful coexistence in 1954. This honeymoon period was short-lived. The 1962 border war shattered illusions of fraternity, leaving behind a legacy of mistrust that continues to inform strategic thinking on both sides.

Subsequent decades oscillated between cautious engagement and confrontation. Diplomatic relations were restored in 1976, and confidence-building agreements in 1988 and 1993 sought to manage border tensions. Yet, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remained undefined, and the structural sources of friction persisted, including Chinese support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme and a vast array of anti-Indian terrorist proxies.

Economic engagement in the 1990s and 2000s introduced a new dimension: while trade volumes soared, border tensions simmered. The Galwan Valley clashes of 2020—where 20 Indian soldiers were killed—served as a brutal reminder that economic interdependence cannot neutralize geopolitical rivalry.

Modi’s China Policy: From Outreach to Disillusionment

When Narendra Modi assumed office in 2014, he aimed to reset the relationship with China on the twin pillars of economic cooperation and strategic dialogue. His initial outreach was bold, even optimistic. Modi personally welcomed Xi Jinping to India and made high-profile gestures, including delisting China as a “country of concern” to attract investment for his flagship “Make in India” program. The expectation was straightforward: economic engagement would temper strategic hostility.

Reality unfolded differently. During Xi’s first visit to India, as Modi showcased Gujarat’s hospitality, Chinese troops were quietly encroaching on Indian territory in Ladakh. That symbolic juxtaposition—a red-carpet welcome in Ahmedabad coinciding with PLA transgressions—foreshadowed the asymmetry in intentions. The summit ended with India dismantling its own defensive positions to de-escalate tensions, an early concession that set a troubling precedent.

Over the next five years, Modi doubled down on engagement. Between 2014 and 2019, he met Xi 18 times—more than he met any other foreign leader. India pursued informal summits at Wuhan (2018) and Mamallapuram (2019), hoping to build “strategic trust.”

Beijing, however, consolidated its grip on the Himalayas, tightened its axis with Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), brought the two countries to the brink of war in Doklam and constructed militarised “border villages” to alter the facts on the ground.

The economic fallout was equally stark. India’s trade deficit with China ballooned to a level exceeding its entire defence budget. In effect, India was financing China’s military modernization even as PLA soldiers made quiet advances along the frontier. Far from delivering mutual trust, Modi’s overtures emboldened Beijing’s revisionism.

The breaking point came in 2020. The Galwan clashes ended two decades of fragile border peace and killed the illusion that dialogue alone could contain China’s ambitions. Yet five years later, Modi’s participation in the SCO summit and reports of renewed bilateral negotiations evoke an uncomfortable question: is India on the verge of repeating its past mistakes?

Economic Interdependence in 2025: Growth with Dependence

Today, the economic dimension of India-China relations is both a lifeline and a liability. India’s trade deficit with China surged to a record $99.2 billion in FY24–25, with imports reaching $113.5 billion and exports slipping to $14.3 billion, reflecting a deep asymmetry. India exports raw materials, textiles, and some software services, while importing a wide range of intermediate goods and critical components from China. The electronics and mobile phone sectors illustrate this interdependence vividly.

India has emerged as the world’s second-largest assembler of mobile phones, accounting for over 11% of global production. This achievement is often celebrated as evidence of India’s manufacturing resurgence. Yet, beneath the surface lies a sobering reality: the sector depends heavily on Chinese inputs. Key components—semiconductors, display panels, batteries—are sourced from Chinese suppliers. Even Apple’s plan to relocate 25% of its production to India by 2025 cannot mask this dependence. Chinese brands—Xiaomi, OPPO, vivo—continue to dominate the Indian market.

India has sought to address these vulnerabilities through policy interventions. The Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative emphasizes self-reliance, while Press Note 3 mandates government approval for foreign direct investment from countries sharing a land border with India—a move aimed primarily at Chinese capital. These measures have partially succeeded in regulating Chinese investment, but they have also triggered Beijing’s ire. Chinese state media frame these policies as discriminatory, accusing India of “weaponising its market.”

From Beijing’s perspective, India’s manufacturing surge is a challenge, albeit an incomplete one. The Global Times frequently asserts that India’s rise is limited to assembly operations and lacks technological depth—a narrative that both reflects and reinforces China’s strategic confidence.

The “Early Harvest” Temptation: A Strategic Booby Trap?

Amid this complex economic and strategic backdrop, reports of an “early harvest” agreement on the Sikkim sector have set off alarm bells. The proposed deal would replace the 1890 convention between China and Great Britain and formalize the Sikkim boundary—entirely on Beijing’s terms. On the surface, this might appear as a pragmatic step toward resolving a long-standing dispute. In reality, it carries profound risks.

Historically, New Delhi resisted such sectoral settlements for two reasons. First, it feared that resolving the Sikkim boundary in isolation would constrain India’s negotiating position in the western and eastern sectors. Second—and more critically—it recognised that such a deal could tilt the balance at the India-China-Bhutan trijunction, compromising India’s security in the strategically vital Doklam plateau.

The Doklam standoff in 2017 demonstrated why this area matters. Situated near the Siliguri Corridor—the narrow “Chicken Neck” that connects mainland India to its northeastern states—Doklam is a strategic choke point. Any Chinese ingress here could sever India’s access to its own territory, a scenario with catastrophic security and sovereignty implications.

Moreover, India and China agreed in 2012 that the trijunction would be finalized in consultation with Bhutan. A unilateral settlement now would alienate Thimphu, erode India’s credibility as Bhutan’s security partner, and give China leverage to dictate terms to Bhutan in future negotiations.

The “early harvest” proposal, therefore, is not a confidence-building measure; it is a strategic booby trap. For India to concede ground here would amount to repeating the mistakes of the past—trading territorial leverage for ephemeral diplomatic calm.

Diplomatic Optics: The Tianjin Summit and the Perception of Weakness

Modi’s attendance at the Tianjin SCO summit in 2025 is emblematic of the uneasy duality in India’s China policy: the compulsion to engage diplomatically with Beijing while confronting its aggressive posture on multiple fronts. Unlike the Quad—where India finds natural alignment with fellow democracies, despite occasional disagreements over Russia—the SCO is a China-led platform dominated entirely by authoritarian regimes.

In 2025, the stakes are higher than ever. China’s actions in recent months underscore a pattern of unrelenting assertiveness: the announcement of plans to construct the world’s largest dam on the Brahmaputra near the Indian border, despite grave ecological and strategic implications; the provision of real-time radar and satellite intelligence to Pakistan during India’s May 2025 counterterror strikes; and the rapid expansion of PLA infrastructure along the LAC. Against this backdrop, Modi’s diplomatic overtures at Tianjin risk being interpreted not as statesmanship but as strategic pusillanimity.

China’s Dual-Track Strategy and India’s Constraints

To understand Beijing’s behavior, one must appreciate its dual-track strategy: the simultaneous pursuit of deep economic integration and assertive geopolitical manoeuvring. China’s rise as the “world’s factory” is not merely an economic phenomenon; it is the foundation of a grand strategy that converts industrial dominance into geopolitical leverage. Initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplify this approach, embedding economic dependency to secure long-term influence.

Parallel to economic expansion, China has relentlessly modernised its military and entrenched its presence along contested frontiers—from the Himalayas to the South China Sea. This combination enables Beijing to maintain an image of indispensability while coercing adversaries into asymmetrical concessions.

India, by contrast, faces tangible constraints. Despite significant progress in mobile phone assembly and manufacturing, structural dependence on Chinese components persists. Supply chain gaps, skilled labour shortages, import dependencies in critical sectors and infrastructural bottlenecks hinder India’s ambition to replicate China’s comprehensive industrial ecosystem. Security challenges compound these vulnerabilities: the Himalayan frontier remains volatile, the Indian Ocean sees growing PLA naval activity, and the China-Pakistan nexus continues to exploit India’s western flank.

The Quad, Maritime Posture, and Strategic Balancing

Amid these constraints, India’s regional strategy hinges on coalition-building. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—comprising India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia—remains the linchpin of its Indo-Pacific posture. While political transitions in Washington (particularly the Trump 2.0 administration) have introduced elements of unpredictability, the Quad continues to function as a strategic counterweight to Chinese hegemony.

India’s expanding maritime engagement in 2025 reflects this imperative. The August 2025 joint naval exercise with the Philippines in the South China Sea—conducted within Manila’s Exclusive Economic Zone—was emblematic. Despite the shadow of a nearby Chinese flotilla, the drills proceeded without incident, signalling India’s readiness to assert freedom of navigation and support ASEAN partners. Such initiatives enhance deterrence and underscore India’s commitment to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Trump’s tariffs make deeper trade integration and the search for alternative markets crucial. Joining RCEP or CPTPP can secure market access, but India must avoid over-reliance on China within these blocs by enforcing strict rules of origin, safeguard clauses, and anti-dumping measures to curb Chinese dumping via member nations.

Simultaneously, India needs to diversify supply chains to cut dependence on China for critical sectors like rare earth magnets, pharmaceuticals, automotive components, garment inputs, fertilisers and semiconductors. Strategic engagement with trusted partners in ASEAN, Japan, South Korea and the West, combined with PLI-driven domestic manufacturing, will strengthen resilience and economic security.

Beyond Optics to Substance

For India, the choice is stark: either script its destiny as a confident, autonomous power in a multipolar Indo-Pacific or risk being reduced to a strategic afterthought in a Sino-centric order. The window for decisive action is narrowing. History will judge whether India seizes this moment—or squanders it in Tianjin.

(This is an opinion piece, and views expressed are those of the author only)

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