Iran Strike Temptation: Israel’s Precedent Warns Washington

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Middle East security expert Dennis Citrinowicz cautions the US: without clear goals, strikes on Iran risk escalation, strategic failure, and unintended war

By TRH World Desk

New Delhi, January 13, 2026 — As Washington once again debates military options against Iran, a sobering warning comes from the region itself. Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz, a well-known Middle East expert, has laid out a clear-eyed assessment that should give US policymakers pause. His argument is not ideological—it is strategic. And it is rooted in hard lessons from Israel’s own precedent during the 12-Day War.

The central question, Citrinowicz argues, is not whether the United States can strike Iran, but what exactly it seeks to achieve. “Military power, however overwhelming, is meaningless without clearly defined, realistic, and attainable political objectives,” he wrote on X. History, Citrinowicz wrote, is replete with examples where force, unmoored from strategy, became an end in itself—and a trap.

Is Washington aiming for regime change in Tehran, asked Citrinowicz. “If so, does it expect a coup, a popular uprising, or elite fragmentation? Or is the true objective more limited—forcing Iran back into a new nuclear agreement,” he further asked.

Citrinowicz stated that “each goal requires a fundamentally different strategy. Without this clarity, even a limited strike risks mission creep and strategic drift.”

Citrinowicz’s warning on escalation is especially stark. Iran may not desire a full-scale war with the United States, but regimes under internal and external pressure often respond in unpredictable and irrational ways. “Nationalist backlash, proxy retaliation, or asymmetric responses across the region could quickly spiral beyond Washington’s control,” Citrinowicz warned.

Here, Israel’s experience becomes instructive. “Airstrikes do not produce regime change—certainly not swiftly. Political transformation is a prolonged internal process, not the byproduct of short military campaigns. Expecting otherwise is strategic fantasy,” he argued. It is also unclear whether President Donald Trump—or any US president—would be willing to sustain a long, open-ended conflict with Iran once the initial strikes are over, he added.

If the objective is instead diplomatic—a renewed nuclear deal—Citrinowicz argues the current moment may actually be optimal. Iran faces mounting economic strain and political pressure, potentially making limits on enrichment more palatable than at any point in recent years. Military action could foreclose that window rather than widen it.

Trump’s rhetorical support for Iranian protesters adds another layer of complexity. Symbolic or limited kinetic action, Citrinowicz notes, may raise expectations among opposition groups without delivering real leverage—leaving them exposed and disillusioned. “Worse, such strikes could strengthen hardliners inside Iran by validating their siege narrative,” he warned.

The bottom line is stark and unavoidable: not all objectives are achievable through limited military action. “The United States can prepare target lists and exit strategies, but that is not enough,” argued Citrinowicz. As Israel’s precedent shows, some political outcomes simply cannot be bombed into existence.

In the calculus of war with Iran, restraint backed by strategic clarity may prove more powerful than firepower alone.