India Must Manufacture Its Own Indispensability in Washington
US President Donald Trump, PM Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping (Image credit X.com)
To stop being the U.S.’s taken-for-granted partner, India must turn economic potential into political leverage—through supply-chain strength, smart trade deals, and strategic optics.
By P SESH KUMAR
New Delhi, October 28, 2025 — Why does the United States handle China with kid gloves, indulge Pakistan’s flattery, and push India harder in every negotiation—from trade to oil to geopolitics? The answer lies in a triangle of leverage, theatre, and restraint.
China’s hold over U.S. debt and its chokehold on cheap goods give Beijing systemic power to hurt America’s economy. Pakistan, though far smaller, plays the politics of flattery and transactional loyalty with astonishing agility—charming Washington’s eccentric leaders with instant deliverables, including nomination for Nobel Peace prize. India, in contrast, carries neither China’s financial leverage nor Pakistan’s pliant diplomacy.
It is strong, cacophonically democratic, and deliberate—qualities that might earn ‘respect’ but invite impatience in Washington’s power calculus. While U.S. pressure over Russian oil undercuts Indian sovereignty, it’s worthwhile to examine what short-to-medium-term strategies can convert India’s quiet strength into visible leverage—there is no shortage of long-term theory.
The Unequal Triad
In the choreography of global trade, India should be America’s natural partner—a democracy, a vast market, and a counterweight to China. That is what most educated and well-informed Indians may feel. Yet in Washington’s behavioural matrix, India often finds itself treated neither as an equal nor as an adversary, but as a variable. China commands respect through risk; Pakistan gains access through flattery; India receives lectures through symbolic and ‘useless’ goodwill.
Let us consider the latest diplomatic theatre. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reopened dialogue after months of tariff tension, Beijing’s tone was velvet. Wang called Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump “global leaders whose long-term interactions are the most valuable strategic asset in China–U.S. relations.” Soon, news broke that both sides had reached a framework trade understanding, prompting market euphoria and delaying Beijing’s rare-earth export curbs by a year-a rare Chinese gesture of calm calculation.
By contrast, India’s trade talks with Washington are trudging through five rounds with hard-edged demands: tariff reductions tied to energy politics, future-proof clauses favouring U.S. exporters, and conditional promises of digital-trade access. As one senior Indian negotiator quipped off-record: “China gets a handshake; we get a homework list.”
Debt, Dollars, and Dominance
China’s advantage begins in the U.S. Treasury market. We know that Beijing still holds close to $780 billion in U.S. government debt—making it among America’s largest foreign creditors. That portfolio is not just an investment; it is insurance. The U.S. cannot economically bludgeon a country that bankrolls its fiscal deficit. Each time Washington inches toward default debates, Beijing’s holdings loom silently in the background like what some may call—a nuclear deterrent in spreadsheets.
Add to that China’s command over the bloodstream of global manufacturing. From the smartphone in a Nebraska pocket to the solar panels in Nevada, the phrase Made in China defines affordability in American life. When Beijing restricts exports of gallium, germanium or rare-earth magnets, the Pentagon trembles. The result: Washington criticises loudly but punishes cautiously. That is the power of systemic indispensability.
India lacks that kind of leverage. It does not underwrite the U.S. debt market or dominate Walmart shelves. Its software exports and pharma brilliance matter, but they do not threaten inflation in Kansas or consumer prices in California. In fact, Trump tried to twist India more recently with the much advertised threateningly high visa fee for new H1-B applicants. Clearly, India is a manageable junior partner—a country the U.S. can pressure without destabilising its own economy.
The Sycophant’s Advantage
If China commands respect through fear, Pakistan extracts favour through flattery. Decades of American engagement with Islamabad have conditioned Washington to respond to Pakistan’s performative loyalty: quick intelligence feeds, counter-terrorism optics, or logistical access in crisis. Each of these appeals to the American (read Trump’s) craving for short-term wins.
When Donald Trump re-entered the White House, Pakistan instinctively recalibrated. Islamabad offered energy-sector openings, (some say even private Crypto deals) pledged cooperation on Afghan stability, and wrapped everything in the language of personal loyalty—recommending and repeatedly announcing its nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace prize. Within months, a U.S.–Pakistan trade and oil-development agreement was announced, promising reduced tariffs and joint projects—a deal tailor-made for Trump’s appetite for transactional theatre.
India cannot and will not play that game. New Delhi’s diplomacy is slower, institutional, often morally tinged. It negotiates, it reasons, it refuses sycophancy. That dignity, admirable as it is, does not play well with Washington’s (Trump’s) television-driven politics. Pakistan delivers instant optics; India demands long-term equality. For a White House driven by headlines, the choice is obvious.
Oil, Sanctions, and Sovereignty
Then comes the sorest nerve: Russian crude. Since 2022, India has bought discounted oil from Moscow to ostensibly cushion its inflation and ensure what it calls ‘energy security’. But what is economic realism for India becomes ideological defiance for Washington. The U.S., eager to isolate Russia, has used sanctions and moral suasion to pressure New Delhi into compliance.
When the U.S. linked tariff relief to reduced Russian imports, it was not just trade leverage—it was a test of sovereignty. For a democracy where fuel prices directly shape electoral moods, such interference is politically radioactive. Every litre of petrol carries not just energy value but electoral volatility. Washington’s pressure thus undercuts the very autonomy that forms the moral spine of India’s democracy. Ironically, the world’s oldest democracy keeps lecturing the world’s largest democracy on freedom of choice.
Why China Can Hurt, Pakistan Can Please, and India Must Please Itself
In one sentence: China can harm the U.S. more than India ever could; Pakistan can please U.S. egos faster than India ever will; and India, therefore, must learn to please itself first—by building leverage that commands respect, not by seeking it.
Beijing’s ability to rattle markets or delay rare-earth exports gives it an insurance policy. Islamabad’s talent for dramatized loyalty earns it episodic indulgence. New Delhi, by contrast, is too independent to flatter and too responsible to threaten. The result? It becomes the partner the U.S. takes for granted—the one that bends but does not break, pays but does not play politics.
To change that, India must manufacture its own indispensability.
Is there a Pragmatic Way Forward—Not Theory but Action
- Build Tangible Leverage in U.S. Supply Chains: India must fast-track PLI (Production linked incentive) schemes in sectors that directly feed American consumption—electronics, APIs, textiles, green tech, and semiconductors. If the next iPhone assembled in Chennai ends up in Chicago, Washington’s tone will change overnight. By 2027, a $40 billion export footprint from such sectors could turn India from a friendly partner into an irreplaceable supplier. Can India do it?
- Trade Oil for Tech-Smart Quid Pro Quo: Instead of defending Russian crude purchases, India should bargain: taper imports gradually in exchange for long-term LNG supply contracts, refinery upgrades, and hydrogen-tech transfer. The U.S. loves transactional symmetry; give Trump a “win” on Russia and take three on energy security and technology.
- Modular Trade Deals, Not Mega Traps: Rather than waiting for a mammoth Free Trade Agreement (FTA), India should pursue quick, sector-specific accords—digital trade, aerospace co-production, agri-tech exchange—each with six-month deliverables. Micro-deals build macro trust. This appears to have already been adopted by India. Final touches are understood to be underway.
- Use the Dollar Corridor Creatively: Washington’s weaponisation of the dollar can be met with diversified payment systems-expanding rupee-dirham or rupee-rouble settlements via GIFT City. Even partial de-risking sends a quiet message: coercion has limits.
- Play the Optics Game: Image matters in Washington. India should choreograph visibility—launch a U.S.–India Climate Tech Fund, host a Silicon Valley–Bengaluru Startup Bridge, and invite American governors to invest in Indian industrial corridors. Pakistan mastered this theatre; India can perform it with substance.
From Appeasement to Agency
India’s challenge is not to mimic China’s menace or Pakistan’s sycophancy but to build its own grammar of influence—rooted in supply-chain indispensability, transactional symmetry, and political optics. If New Delhi executes even half of this agenda within three years, the next U.S. trade negotiation will begin not with a list of demands from Washington but with a list of options from India.
That will be the day India stops being the “P” in India-Pakistan and becomes the “I” in Indispensable.
(This is an opinion piece, and views expressed are those of the author only)
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