China’s Fourth Plenum: Empty Chairs, Purges, and Fear in Beijing

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Record-low attendance at China’s Fourth Plenum and a sweeping purge of Central Committee and PLA members reveal the tightening grip of Xi Jinping’s discipline campaign — and the paranoia that now defines his rule.

By TRH Foreign Affairs Desk

New Delhi, October 23, 2025 — When the Chinese Communist Party’s Fourth Plenum concluded, what made headlines was not its communique on “high-quality development” or “technological self-efficiency,” but the stark visual of empty chairs — a symbol of Beijing’s deepest political cleansing in years.

China observer Neil Thomas noted in a thread on X that only 168 of 205 full members and 147 of 171 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the meeting — an attendance rate of just 84%, the lowest in the post-Mao era. Behind those absences lies a story of purges, power consolidation, and fear coursing through the veins of China’s political and military elite.

A Record Purge in Xi’s Era of Discipline

The Central Committee confirmed the expulsion of 10 members and 4 alternates, including figures such as former Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chair He Weidong and political commissar Miao Hua — names long rumoured to be under investigation.

One expulsion, however, stood out: that of Zhang Fengzhong, director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Rocket Force — a branch already rocked by allegations of deep corruption and disloyalty. The move signals that Xi’s anti-graft drive within the military is far from over, and that more heads could roll.

In an unexpected reshuffle, Zhang Shengmin, the head of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission and the architect of recent military purges, was promoted to replace the ousted He Weidong as second-ranked vice-chairman of the CMC. His elevation formalizes the merging of military command and internal surveillance — a hallmark of Xi’s governing style.

The Politics Behind the Silence

While the Fourth Plenum communique spoke of “technological self-reliance” and “new breakthroughs in deepening reforms,” its subtext was unmistakable: control. The silence of state media on the missing generals, the omission of Politburo replacements, and the decision to leave He Weidong’s Politburo seat vacant all point to Xi’s decision to wait until the 21st Party Congress in 2027 to rebuild the top military and political leadership — on his terms.

Eleven alternate members were promoted to fill the vacancies left by the purged and deceased, but seven were skipped — a rare procedural deviation that analysts interpret as a sign of ongoing investigations or political disfavour.

As Lei’s Real Talk noted on X: “Nine generals vanished overnight before the Plenum. The Defense Ministry broke tradition to make the announcement. State media stayed silent. As the Plenum begins, a hidden war is raging inside China’s military. Was Xi cleaning house — or was Zhang Youxia taking control?”

Beyond Discipline: A Struggle for Loyalty

This is not merely about corruption. The PLA Rocket Force, responsible for China’s nuclear and missile arsenal, has been at the heart of an internal power struggle. Its purge signals Xi’s deep mistrust of the military — the very institution that anchors his control.

By promoting Zhang Shengmin — the Party’s top enforcer — Xi effectively places discipline above command. The message is clear: loyalty now trumps competence, and surveillance has replaced solidarity as the glue holding the Party together.

For Xi, the timing of the purge matters. As China faces slowing growth, worsening relations with the West, and domestic unease, a show of internal “cleansing” serves two purposes — consolidating personal authority and warning potential dissenters that the system still has teeth.

But the cost is visible. A meeting that should have projected stability instead showcased absence and fear. Empty chairs at the Fourth Plenum are not just a logistical anomaly — they are an image of a ruling elite hollowed out by suspicion.

The Long Shadow of the Fourth Plenum

The official communique framed the Plenum as a roadmap for “deepening reform,” “advancing military modernization,” and “achieving breakthroughs in high-quality development.” Yet the subtext reads differently: the CCP is reforming itself not to open up, but to fortify against internal decay.

The Fourth Plenum was supposed to reassure the world that China’s political center remains unshaken. Instead, it confirmed what insiders have whispered for months — that Xi’s China is a system turning inward, where discipline replaces debate and purges replace policy.

As the dust settles, Beijing’s corridors echo with one truth: the emptier the chairs, the tighter Xi’s control.

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