Audit Is Not a Witch Hunt: CAG Reports Are Not Proof of Corruption
CAG Building in New Delhi and Suresh Kalmadi (Image credit LinkedIn)
From 2G to Coalgate, India mistook audits for investigations—weakening accountability and justice alike.
By P. SESH KUMAR
New Delhi, January 6, 2026 — In India’s emotionally charged discourse on corruption, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has often been cast either as a heroic sleuth exposing grand conspiracies or as a political weapon destabilising governments. Both views are flawed. An audit is not a witch hunt, and the CAG is neither a detective agency nor a prosecutor. Misunderstanding this distinction has distorted public expectations, politicised accountability, and, paradoxically, weakened the anti-corruption ecosystem.
A recent G20 document on auditing and corruption offers a timely corrective. It reiterates a foundational truth: Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) exist to ensure financial accountability, not to establish criminal guilt. Audits assess whether public money was spent lawfully, efficiently, and transparently. They are ex post exercises based on records—not raids, wiretaps, or compelled testimony. Establishing mens rea (criminal intent) lies squarely with investigative agencies and courts.
This distinction was lost during the headline-grabbing years of the early 2010s. CAG reports on 2G spectrum (2010), coal block allocations (2012), and the Commonwealth Games (2010) were amplified as conclusive proof of corruption. Terms like “₹1.76 lakh crore loss” and “Coalgate” entered popular lexicon, stoking protests and political churn. Yet, when cases reached courtrooms, outcomes diverged sharply from public expectations.
In the 2G case, a special CBI court acquitted all accused in 2017, noting the absence of legally admissible evidence of corruption despite years of trial. The court observed that rumour and speculation had substituted proof. The CAG had flagged policy irregularities and estimated “presumptive loss”—a legitimate audit exercise—but that was never proof of bribery or conspiracy. Loss to the exchequer does not automatically imply illicit gain.
A similar arc followed coal block allocations. The CAG highlighted non-transparent processes and estimated windfall gains; it did not allege corruption per se. Investigations followed, some convictions occurred, others did not, and the Supreme Court cancelled allocations as a civil corrective—not a criminal verdict. The CWG audit exposed egregious lapses and cost overruns, but marquee prosecutions largely collapsed for want of evidence, culminating years later in closure reports.
Retendering Under Scrutiny: CAG Advisories and Global Lessons
These episodes reveal the core problem: audits were mistaken for investigations. The CAG’s role is to raise red flags, not to catch officials red-handed. International standards (INTOSAI) are explicit: detection of fraud is incidental to auditing, not its primary aim. Treating audit findings as guilt in the court of public opinion short-circuits due process and invites disappointment when courts apply higher evidentiary thresholds.
None of this diminishes the CAG’s importance. On the contrary, audits are indispensable to democratic accountability. They inform Parliament, empower oversight committees, and catalyse corrective action. Investigative agencies often begin where audits end—using audit trails to probe deeper with statutory powers. CAG officers frequently assist by sharing records and testifying as expert witnesses. This is the system working as designed: auditors illuminate; investigators prosecute; judges adjudicate.
Problems arise when we overextend the auditor. Inflating the CAG into a quasi-prosecutor politicises the office, invites accusations of bias, and chills governance. Officials become risk-averse, fearing that any policy choice could later be branded a “scam” based on loss estimates divorced from context. Meanwhile, investigative agencies may grow complacent, expecting auditors to do their job.
Comparative perspective helps. Countries following the Westminster model (India, UK) keep auditors non-judicial. By contrast, Cour des Comptes systems (France) empower audit courts to impose sanctions. If India wants auditors to punish wrongdoing, it must redesign institutions. Until then, expecting the CAG to deliver convictions is unfair and counterproductive.
The right lesson from India’s “scam decade” is not that audits failed, but that roles were conflated. The CAG did what it must: flagged irregularities, quantified risks, and informed Parliament. Where prosecutions faltered, the reasons lay in evidentiary gaps, investigative shortcomings, or judicial standards—not in the audit mandate.
Accountability is a relay race, not a one-man sprint. Deifying or demonising the CAG helps neither governance nor justice. Respecting institutional boundaries does. When auditors audit fearlessly, investigators investigate diligently, and courts judge impartially, corruption can be exposed, punished, and prevented.
An audit is a watchdog’s bark—loud, necessary, and corrective. It is not the bite. Confusing the two weakens the fight against corruption. Understanding this strengthens it.
(This is an opinion piece. Views expressed are author’s own)
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