By TRH Foreign Affairs Desk
Major General Dr. S. B. Asthana argues India can use the SCO to counter terrorism, deepen Central Asian engagement and bridge the divide between the Eurasian bloc and the West
New Delhi, August 31, 2026 — The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is emerging as an increasingly important platform for Eurasian security and geopolitical engagement, but its ability to evolve into a cohesive security framework remains constrained by internal rivalries, China’s growing influence and institutional weaknesses.
In an analysis published on his website Asthana Writes, Major General Dr. S. B. Asthana argues that India occupies a unique strategic position within the SCO because of its simultaneous engagement with the West, Russia, Central Asia and the wider Global South.
“India has good relations with Western countries and is uniquely placed to act as a bridge between SCO and the West,” Asthana writes.
His analysis, titled “Balancing the Eurasian Giant: India’s Strategic Role in Strengthening SCO Military & Security Cooperation,” examines how India can contribute to military and security cooperation within the Eurasian bloc while maintaining its strategic autonomy.
Established in 2001, the SCO was originally focused on regional security, economic cooperation and political stability. Its membership has subsequently expanded, increasing its geopolitical weight across Eurasia.
Asthana argues that the decline in confidence in traditional global governance institutions has increased the importance of regional organisations such as the SCO.
However, he cautions against viewing the organisation as a unified military alliance. The SCO contains major geopolitical competitors, including China, India and Pakistan, while Russia has its own strategic priorities.
According to Asthana, four nuclear-armed states—China, Russia, India and Pakistan—are present within the organisation, making regional security cooperation both necessary and exceptionally complicated.
One of the principal concerns identified by Asthana is China’s disproportionate economic, political and military influence across the SCO region.
He points to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese financing and expanding defence cooperation with Central Asian states as factors that have increased Beijing’s leverage.
Asthana argues that China’s growing military presence, arms sales, border-security cooperation and joint exercises could potentially push the SCO towards becoming a China-dominated organisation rather than a genuinely collective security platform.
For India, this creates a strategic dilemma.
New Delhi must participate actively in the SCO to protect its interests in Eurasia, while simultaneously ensuring that the organisation does not become an instrument for expanding Chinese strategic influence.
Asthana identifies India-China tensions as one of the most serious obstacles to deeper SCO military cooperation.
The military confrontation following the 2020 Galwan clash created a deep trust deficit between the two countries. Although disengagement has taken place in some areas, Asthana argues that the broader de-escalation process remains incomplete.
India-Pakistan rivalry presents another major obstacle.
According to Asthana, differences over terrorism, Kashmir and cross-border security complicate the use of SCO mechanisms for coordinated counterterrorism.
He also highlights differences among SCO members over the definition and prioritisation of terrorism. While Russia and Central Asian countries remain particularly concerned about threats emanating from Afghanistan, India places greater emphasis on cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistan.
Asthana sees India’s participation in the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) as an important avenue for strengthening the SCO’s security architecture.
He argues that India can contribute through intelligence sharing, counterterrorism cooperation, cyber expertise and efforts to combat terror financing.
He also advocates strengthening the SCO’s database of terrorist organisations and expanding counterterrorism cooperation to address online radicalisation and cyber-enabled extremism.
For India, this could provide an opportunity to bring its counterterrorism priorities into a broader Eurasian security framework.
Asthana argues that the nature of warfare is changing rapidly. Cyberattacks, artificial intelligence, disinformation, space capabilities and hybrid warfare are becoming increasingly important components of national security.
India, he suggests, can play a technological role in developing a more secure digital ecosystem within the SCO.
His analysis advocates greater cooperation in cybersecurity, AI, quantum technologies, space security and digital financial infrastructure.
Such cooperation, he argues, could allow India to contribute to SCO security without turning the organisation into an anti-Western military bloc.
Connectivity is another area where Asthana sees significant scope for Indian engagement.
He highlights the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Chabahar Port as potential alternatives or complements to China-led connectivity initiatives.
For India, deeper connectivity with Central Asia can reduce its geographical disadvantage while expanding trade and strategic engagement with the region.
Asthana argues that transparent and consultative connectivity projects could help Central Asian states diversify their economic relationships.
A central theme of Asthana’s analysis is that India’s participation in the SCO does not necessarily contradict its growing partnerships with the United States and other Western countries.
He describes India’s approach as one of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.
In his assessment, India can participate in SCO security initiatives while simultaneously maintaining partnerships such as the Quad and its broader Indo-Pacific engagements.
The objective, therefore, should not be to turn the SCO into an anti-Western alliance, but to build a regional security framework capable of addressing terrorism, cyber threats, border instability and emerging technologies.
Asthana concludes that the SCO has significant potential but remains constrained by internal political divisions, China’s dominance and its weak institutional framework.
He argues that the organisation needs stronger counterterrorism mechanisms, deeper military-to-military cooperation, cyber-defence capabilities and more effective crisis-response arrangements.
For India, the opportunity lies in using its military, technological and diplomatic capabilities to shape the organisation while maintaining strategic autonomy.
The larger strategic proposition is clear: India need not choose between the SCO and the West.
Instead, Asthana argues, New Delhi can use its relationships with both sides to act as a bridge in an increasingly multipolar world.
The coming years, he suggests, will determine whether the SCO can transform itself from a forum for dialogue into a credible regional security mechanism—or remain a largely symbolic grouping whose members continue to pursue competing strategic interests.
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